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Abstract 
 
Exploiting time series of the cost of a staples basket across 75 Russian regions over 1994-2000, 
price linkages of the regions are analyzed with the use of Granger causality as a tool. Price 
linkages of Russian regions are found extensive: on average, an individual regional market is 
linked through prices with 62% of others. Neither isolated clusters of regions nor autarkic 
regions are revealed; each region is linked with all others either directly or indirectly, through a 
chain of no more than two intermediate regions. Spatial autocorrelation is found to be 
widespread, taking place in two thirds of regions. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
A spatially dispersed goods market can be defined as integrated if there are no barriers to 
trade among locations except for “natural,” irremovable ones such as distances separating 
locations. A necessary condition for market to be integrated is occurrence of prices linkages 
across locations, so that a price shock in one location evokes responses in others. Thus, a pattern 
of inter-location price linkages complements a pattern of goods market integration obtained by 
other methods. 
A tool for analyzing price linkages is Granger causality. The price of a good in one (first) 
location is said to be Granger caused by price in other (second) location if past values of price in 
the second location are significant in explanation of the current value of the first location’s price. 
This paper analyzes price linkages across 75 (of all the 89) regions of Russia in 1994-2000, 
exploiting the above tool. The cost of a staples basket (relative to its cost for Russia as a whole) 
is used as a price representative. 
Price linkages of Russian regions are found extensive. On average, an individual regional 
market is linked through prices with 62% of others, with the minimal number equaling 35%. 
Such a pattern corroborates the pattern of market integration obtained earlier, in which the most 
regions are integrated or tending to integration with the national market.  
The pattern of  price linkages sheds light on the issue of integration clubs. The integration 
club (an analog of convergence club in economic growth) is a group of regions that are not 
integrated or tending to integration with the national market, while being integrated or tending to 
integration with one another. Analyzing price linkages, neither isolated groups of regions nor 
autarkic regions are found. Price in each region is linked with prices in all others either directly 
or indirectly, through a chain of no more than two intermediate regions. This provides an 
evidence of absence of integration clubs in the Russian market. 
A dependence of prices in a region on prices in adjacent regions implies spatial 
autocorrelation. It is found to be widespread, taking place in two thirds of regions. This fact 
should be taken into account while spatially modeling Russian market with the use of data on the 
cost of staples basket.   3
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A spatially dispersed goods market can be defined as integrated if there are no barriers to 
trade among its spatial segments (locations) except for “natural,” irremovable ones such as 
physical distances separating locations. Provided that the market is integrated, prices across 
locations should be linked, so that a price shock in one location evokes responses in others. 
Sometimes, such linkages themselves are considered as an indication of market integration. 
However, price linkages are only a necessary condition for market integration, and not a 
sufficient one. Given an occurrence of price linkage between two locations, we can conclude 
nothing regarding the existence of trade barriers but that if they exist, they are not so high as to 
fully block trade between these locations. Nonetheless, an analysis of inter-location price 
linkages complements a pattern obtained through analyzing market integration as such, providing 
additional aspects of this pattern.    
Analyzing Russia’s market integration, Gluschenko (2006) divides regions of the country 
into three groups: (a) regions integrated with the national market over 1994-2000; (b) non-
integrated regions tending toward integration with the national market; and (c) non-integrated 
regions that show no indication of an integrating trend. In such a pattern, however, the 
occurrence of “integration clubs” (an analog of convergence clubs in economic growth; see, e.g., 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) remains an open question. Among regions that are not integrated 
(or/and not tending to integration) with the national market, there may be regions that are 
integrated (or/and tending to integration)  with one another, so forming integration clubs and thus 
making integration of the Russian market to be fragmented. This paper aims to shed light on this 
issue. One more objective of the paper is to verify the above pattern of market integration, 
examining the extensiveness of inter-regional price linkages. At last, the effect of spatial lags is 
studied.  
The empirical methodology is based on testing for Granger causality. The source data are 
time series of the cost of a staples basket across 75 regions of Russia for 1994-2000 with a 
monthly frequency. Using this methodology and data, no indications of integration clubs in the 
Russian goods market are revealed. Price linkages of Russian regions are found extensive: on 
average, an individual regional market is linked through prices with 62% of others. Thus, the 
pattern of price linkages is compatible with that of market integration, as the latter suggests that   4
only 20% of Russian regions are not integrated with the national market and have no trend to 
integration, the reason for non-integration being, for the most part, a constant persistent 
difference in prices. Spatial autocorrelation is found to be widespread, taking place in two thirds 
of regions. 
The analysis in this paper relates to studies by Goodwin, Grennes, and McCurdy (1999) 
and Berkowitz, DeJong, and Husted (1998), who also analyzed causal relationships between 
prices in the Russian market. The first paper uses data running from June of 1993 through 
December of 1994 with a weekly frequency and covering five cities and four individual goods. 
Both formal and informal (“gray”) markets are considered. Goodwin et al. find extensive 
evidence of causality between prices across city formal markets, but weaker evidence for 
informal markets. The paper by Berkowitz et al. uses prices for five goods; their data run from 
February of 1992 through February of 1995 with a weekly frequency, covering 25 cities. They 
find greater evidence of causality between prices across the cities in their sample: the percentage 
of instances of causality varies across goods from 50.4% to 88.5%. This paper differs from the 
above ones, first of all, in the data. Covering most of Russian regions and spanning 1994-2000, it 
provides a comprehensive pattern of price linkages throughout the country over the period of 
improvements in market integration.  
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The price representative for the analysis is the cost of the basket of 25 basic food goods 
defined as the standard by the Russian statistical agency, Goskomstat, between January 1997 and 
June 2000 (see Goskomstat, 1996, p. 428, for a description of basket composition). This basket 
represents about one third of the food items in the Russian consumer price index (CPI) and, as 
calculated from data reported by de Masi and Koen (1995), 56.7% of the 1993 weights in the 
national CPI-food. The costs of the basket (including those for the second half of 2000 and 
retrospectively calculated for 1994-1996) were obtained directly from Goskomstat. 
The price data were collected in capital cities of the Russian regions. The sample covers 75 
of Russia’s 89 regions. Data are lacking for ten autonomous okrugs, the Chechen Republic, and 
the Republic of Ingushetia. Two other regions are omitted. The City of Moscow is 
simultaneously an administratively distinct “city-region” of the Russian Federation and the   5
capital city of the surrounding Moscow Oblast. The same holds for St. Petersburg and the 
Leningrad Oblast. That is why these cities-regions are present in the sample, while their 
surrounding oblasts are not. The data are monthly, spanning 84 months, from January of 1994 
through December of 2000. 
There are missing observations in the time series used. Most occur in 1994, which has 42 
missing observations (4.7% of the yearly total) in 17 regional time series. The remainder of the 
data set lacks only 9 observations. To fill the gaps, missing values are approximated by the food 
component of the regional monthly CPIs. The interpolated value is the arithmetic mean of the 
nearest known preceding cost of the basket inflated to the required time point, and the nearest 
known succeeding cost deflated this point. 
Let r and s index regions (r, s =1,…,R) and t indexes time (t = 0,…,T). The source price 
variable is the log relative cost of the basket,  Prt = ln(prt/p0t), where prt is the local cost of the 
basket and p0t is  the cost of the basket for Russia as a whole. To isolate price shocks, Prt is 
cleaned of deterministic components through detrending and debreaking, producing P′r as 
rt rt P ν ˆ = ′ , where  rt ν ˆ  is the estimate of residual in regression (across t = 0,…,T) 
Prt = α0 + α1t + α2t
2 + α3Bθrt + νrt.                       (1)    
The quadratic trend is taken to approximate nonlinear trends found in the time series; 
experiments with polynomials of different orders suggest that the second order is enough for 
such an approximation. The structural break is due to the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia. 
It is modeled by Bθrt = 1 if t < θ, and zero otherwise. The break points, θ, are not uniform across 
regions, varying from 1998:08 through 1999:02. They are found by estimating (1) for θ = 
1998:08,…,1999:02 for a given region, and then choosing θ that yields the least sum of squared 
residuals.  
For each region pair (r, s), the following regressions are estimated across t = l,…, T: 
t s l t r l s t r s l t s l s t s s s st
t r l t s l r t s r l t r l r t r r r rt
P P P P P
P P P P P
) ( , ) ( 1 , 1 ) ( , ) ( 1 , 1 ) ( 0 ) (
) ( , ) ( 1 , 1 ) ( , ) ( 1 , 1 ) ( 0 ) (
... ...
... ...
ε + ′ ψ + + ′ ψ + ′ ϕ + + ′ ϕ + ϕ = ′
ε + ′ ψ + + ′ ψ + ′ ϕ + + ′ ϕ + ϕ = ′
− − − −
− − − −
;            (2) 
and the following hypotheses are tested: H0(sr):  0 ... ) ( 1 ) ( = ψ = = ψ l r r  (P′s does not Granger cause 
P′r) and H0(rs):  0 ... ) ( 1 ) ( = ψ = = ψ l s s  (P′r does not Granger cause P′s). Throughout the paper, the 
10-percent significance level is accepted. Rejection of, say, H0(sr) implies a “causal” relationship 
among prices in r and s, the latter Granger causing the former. An interpretation is that a price   6
shock in s at any point in time from t – l,…, t –1 evokes response in r, so suggesting that there is 
a price linkage between these regions. A rejection of H0(rs) will be denoted as r → s; that of H0(sr) 
will be denoted as s → r or r ← s; and joint rejection of H0(rs) and H0(sr), implying bi-directional 
causality or feedback, will be denoted as r ↔ s. 
Having run the Granger causality test for all region pairs, the results can be summarized in 
an R×R matrix C = (Csr) such that Csr = 1 if r → s, and Csr = 0 otherwise; Crr ≡ 1. In fact, this is 
the adjacency matrix of a “causality graph” displaying direct price linkages between regions. If 
price in r does not affect price in s, but price in r affects price in q which, in turn, affects price in 
s, then regions r and s can be defined as linked indirectly (Csr = 0, but Csq = 1 and Cqr = 1). This 
definition is valid for any chain of intermediate regions instead of single q. An occurrence of 
indirect linkage between r and s implies that there is a path from r to s in the graph represented 
by C. The (R – 1)-th power of C provides a pattern of all direct and indirect price linkages; its 
zero rs-th element implies that there are neither direct nor indirect linkages between r and s. This 
pattern answers the question of whether the national market is fragmented to a few isolated 
submarkets. If rows and columns of C
R–1 can be reordered so that it becomes a block diagonal 
matrix, then this is the case. A block represents an isolated submarket, regions in which have 
price linkages with one another, and no one is linked with a region beyond this submarket. It is 
such submarkets that can potentially be integration clubs. A one-element block is an autarkic 
regional market that has price linkages with no one other region. 
In the spatial context, an analog of autocorrelation is possible (Anselin, 1988). As spatial 
autocorrelation can result in model misspecifications if it is ignored, it is important to reveal 
whether it takes place in the data under consideration. The notion of spatial lag is ambiguous, 
since, in contrast to time series, a “preceding” observation can be non-unique. As a rule, a spatial 
lag “r – 1” for location r is constructed artificially from observations for contiguous locations. 
Here, a region’s spatial lag, P′“r-1”,t, is a weighted average of prices in neighboring (from the 
standpoint of trade) regions: P′“r-1”,t = ∑∑
==
′
R
s
st
R
q
rq rs P w w
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) / ( , where wrs = 1 if s is a “trade 
neighbor” of r and zero otherwise; vrr  ≡ 0. Trade neighborhood takes account of actual 
communications between regions rather than their physical contiguity. For the most part, trade 
neighbors of a given region are, indeed, contiguous regions, but there are a number of 
exceptions. For example, the Kaliningrad Oblast, being an exclave, shares no common border   7
with any other region of Russia. Saint Petersburg is taken as its trade neighbor. Another example 
is the Kamchatka and Magadan oblasts which share a common border, but no trade occurs 
through it. For the both, the Primorski Krai is taken as their trade neighbor, since deliveries of 
goods to these regions come through Vladivostok, the capital city of the Primorski Krai. To 
detect spatial autocorrelation, testing for Granger causality is applied as well. If “r – 1” → r, it is 
interpreted as evidence of spatial autocorrelation.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Before testing for Granger causality, the lags length, l, in (2) should be assigned. A 
conventional procedure of choosing it is to estimate (2) across a set of l and then to take a proper 
number basing on the Akaike or Schwarz criterion individually for each pair (r, s). Given 2775 
pairs produced by 75 regions, such a procedure would be a daunting task. Therefore, a different 
way is exploited: regressions (2) are estimated and tested with l = 3, 6, and 12, and these results 
are compared across l. Table 1 compares some summary statistics of the results; and Table 2 
repots correlation between results for different lag lengths. The numbers of instances of causality 
are those for a given region r; they are computed as follows. For r → s,  ∑
=
→ − =
R
s
sr r C N
1
1; for r 
← s,  ∑
=
← − =
R
s
rs r C N
1
1; for r ↔ s,  ∑
=
↔ − =
R
s
sr rs r C C N
1
1; the total number of causality instances 
is  ↔ ← → − + = r r r r N N N N . Figure 1 compares histograms of causality instances for l = 3, 6, and 
12. Each plot in the figure combines all the three histograms for a given direction of causality. A 
histogram column in the plot for, say, r → s means the percentage of regions r with Nr→ falling 
into a given interval. 
  
Table 1. Summary statistics of results for different lag lengths 
Instances of causality (sum across s), percentage 
r → s  r ← s  r ↔ s  Total  Statistic 
3 lags  6 lags  12 lags 3 lags 6 lags 12 lags 3 lags 6 lags 12 lags  3 lags  6 lags 12 lags
Minimum  13.5  10.8  9.5 9.5 9.5 6.8 1.4 1.4 0.0  29.7  35.1  16.2 
Maximum  66.2 63.5 60.8 74.3 78.4 73.0 28.4 43.2 36.5 82.4 87.8 82.4 
Mean  36.5 38.9 30.3 36.5 38.9 30.3 13.4 16.2  9.4  59.6 61.7 51.2 
   8
 
 Table 2. Coefficients of correlation between results for different lag lengths 
r → s  r ← s  r ↔ s  Total causality  Correlation 
with results for  3 lags 6 lags 12 lags 3 lags 6 lags 12 lags 3 lags 6 lags 12 lags 3 lags  6 lags 12 lags
3  lags  – 0.79  0.48 – 0.71  0.23 – 0.68  0.36 – 0.82  0.52 
6 lags  0.79 – 0.60  0.71 – 0.49  0.68 – 0.61  0.82 – 0.64 
12 lags  0.48 0.60  –  0.23 0.49  –  0.36 0.61  –  0.52 0.64  – 
 
   
 
By and large, the results for 3, 6, and 12 lags prove to be fairly similar, having no 
fundamental qualitative differences. As could be expected, additional lags increase detected 
instances of causality when l changes from 3 to 6. However, the loss in the degrees of freedom 
decreases detected instances of causality if 6 lags more are added. Thus, 6 lags seems to be a 
proper lag length. From the intuitive standpoint, a half-year delay is believed enough for evoking 
a response in the very distant regions of the country. From the statistical standpoint, such a loss 
Figure 1. Histograms of results obtained with different lag lengths 
0
10
20
30
40
50
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50
instances of r -> s causality
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
(
%
)
3 lags
6 lags
12 lags
0
10
20
30
40
50
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60
instances of r <- s causality
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
(
%
)
3 lags
6 lags
12 lags
0
10
20
30
40
50
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-32
instances of r <-> s causality
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
(
%
)
3 lags
6 lags
12 lags
0
10
20
30
40
50
11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70
 instances of causality, total
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
(
%
)
3 lags
6 lags
12 lags  9
in the degrees of freedom is reasonably small. Anyway, as the comparisons suggest, a deviation 
from optimal lag lengths cannot sufficiently distort the pattern of causality. 
Table 3 summarizes results of testing for Granger causality for the baseline case of 6 lags. 
The second through fifth columns report Nr→, Nr←, Nr↔, and Nr, respectively, for a given region. 
The last column contains p-value of the null hypothesis that the spatially lagged price do not 
Granger cause the price in a given region, values above the critical significance level (of 10%) 
being marked with bold italics. The number of region’s trade neighbors are in parentheses in this 
column. 
 
Table 3. Results of Granger causality tests 
 
Instances of causality (sum across s), percentage 
Region r 
r → s  r ← s  r ↔ s  Total 
P(H0(“r–1”,r))
Rep. of Karelia  24.3  17.6  4.1  37.8  0.545 (2) 
Rep.  of  Komi    52.7 48.6 25.7 75.7  0.026 (1) 
Arkhangelsk  Obl.  28.4 50.0 16.2 62.2  0.103 (2) 
Vologda  Obl.  24.3 45.9 14.9 55.4  0.058 (4) 
Murmansk  Obl.  41.9 52.7 17.6 77.0  0.076 (1) 
Saint Petersburg  23.0  17.6  2.7  37.8  0.603 (5) 
Novgorod  Obl.  31.1 33.8 10.8 54.1  0.037 (3) 
Pskov Obl.  16.2  31.1  5.4  41.9  0.971 (3) 
Kaliningrad Obl.  20.3  20.3  1.4  39.2  0.719 (1) 
Bryansk Obl.  25.7  24.3  8.1  41.9  0.021 (4) 
Vladimir Obl.  27.0  16.2  8.1  35.1  0.417 (4) 
Ivanovo Obl.  36.5  18.9  8.1  47.3  0.302 (4) 
Kaluga  Obl.  40.5 45.9 17.6 68.9  0.851 (4) 
Kostroma  Obl.  33.8 45.9 16.2 63.5  0.109 (4) 
Moscow 29.7  12.2  5.4  36.5  0.795 (7) 
Oryol  Obl.  47.3 37.8 23.0 62.2  0.002 (4) 
Ryazan Obl.  33.8  18.9  6.8  45.9  0.862 (7) 
Smolensk  Obl.  56.8 50.0 31.1 75.7  0.001 (4) 
Tver  Obl.  41.9 44.6 20.3 66.2  0.001 (4) 
Tula  Obl.  35.1 45.9 21.6 59.5  0.117 (5) 
Yaroslavl  Obl.  29.7 9.5 2.7  36.5  0.851 (4) 
Rep. of Mariy El   45.9  47.3  17.6  75.7  0.003 (3) 
Rep.  of  Mordovia  35.1 41.9 18.9 58.1  0.003 (5) 
Chuvash  Rep.    36.5 55.4 18.9 73.0  0.014 (5) 
Kirov  Obl.  41.9 20.3 10.8 51.4  0.616 (7) 
Nizhni Novgorod Obl.  45.9  43.2  17.6  71.6  0.083 (5) 
Belgorod  Obl.  62.2 62.2 43.2 81.1  0.444 (1) 
Voronezh Obl.  33.8  18.9  5.4  47.3  0.514 (6) 
Kursk  Obl.  62.2 31.1 18.9 74.3  0.518 (5) 
Lipetsk Obl.  37.8  29.7  6.8  60.8  0.292 (6) 
Tambov  Obl.  35.1 47.3 21.6 60.8  0.015 (5) 
Rep. of Kalmykia   35.1  24.3  2.7  56.8  0.172 (3) 
Rep.  of  Tatarstan  54.1 43.2 20.3 77.0  0.376 (6) 
Astrakhan  Obl.  58.1 28.4 17.6 68.9  0.597 (3) 
Volgograd  Obl.  54.1 39.2 24.3 68.9  0.311 (5)   10
Instances of causality (sum across s), percentage 
Region r 
r → s  r ← s  r ↔ s  Total 
P(H0(“r–1”,r))
Penza  Obl.  44.6 37.8 17.6 64.9  0.057 (5) 
Samara Obl.  39.2  37.8  8.1  68.9  0.200 (4) 
Saratov  Obl.  48.6 68.9 29.7 87.8  0.007 (6) 
Ulyanovsk Obl.  40.5  31.1  9.5  62.2  0.033 (6) 
Rep. of Adygeya   31.1  12.2  5.4  37.8  0.050 (1) 
Rep.  of  Dagestan  45.9 50.0 23.0 73.0  0.019 (2) 
Kabardian-Balkar Rep.   33.8  40.5  17.6  56.8  0.352 (3) 
Karachaev-Cirkassian  Rep.  36.5 37.8 12.2 62.2  0.132 (3) 
Rep. of Northern Ossetia   47.3  44.6  24.3  67.6  0.021 (2) 
Krasnodar  Krai  63.5 27.0 17.6 73.0  0.914 (4) 
Stavropol  Krai  37.8 40.5 13.5 64.9  0.192 (7) 
Rostov  Obl.  41.9 39.2 17.6 63.5  0.063 (4) 
Rep. of Bashkortostan
     48.6 44.6 18.9 74.3  0.739 (4) 
Udmurt Rep.   37.8  31.1  9.5  59.5  0.337 (3) 
Kurgan Obl.  29.7  59.5 21.6 67.6  0.535 (3) 
Orenburg  Obl.  44.6 73.0 35.1 82.4  0.240 (3) 
Perm Obl.  20.3  31.1  6.8  44.6  0.201 (3) 
Sverdlovsk  Obl.  25.7 36.5 14.9 47.3  0.211 (5) 
Chelyabinsk  Obl.  47.3 52.7 23.0 77.0  0.302 (4) 
Rep.  of  Altai  47.3 62.2 31.1 78.4  0.172 (1) 
Altai  Krai  48.6 36.5 17.6 67.6  0.052 (3) 
Kemerovo  Obl.  43.2 52.7 20.3 75.7  0.062 (5) 
Novosibirsk  Obl.  47.3 43.2 17.6 73.0  0.560 (4) 
Omsk Obl.  29.7  41.9  8.1  63.5  0.605 (2) 
Tomsk Obl.  29.7  23.0  8.1  44.6  0.806 (3) 
Tyumen  Obl.  43.2 52.7 24.3 71.6  0.005 (3) 
Rep. of Buryatia  28.4  13.5  2.7  39.2  0.551 (2) 
Rep. of Tuva   10.8  39.2  5.4  44.6  0.232 (2) 
Rep.  of  Khakasia  45.9 58.1 32.4 71.6  0.202 (3) 
Krasnoyarsk  Krai  35.1 62.2 27.0 70.3  0.098 (5) 
Irkutsk Obl.  12.2  27.0  1.4  37.8  0.633 (3) 
Chita  Obl.  32.4 48.6 20.3 60.8  0.002 (2) 
Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)   40.5  78.4  31.1  87.8  0.085 (1) 
Jewish Autonomous Obl.  41.9  29.7  9.5  62.2  0.123 (2) 
Primorsky Krai  47.3  14.9  6.8  55.4  0.522 (3) 
Khabarovsk  Krai  60.8 37.8 28.4 70.3  0.033 (4) 
Amur  Obl.  48.6 44.6 23.0 70.3  0.119 (3) 
Kamchatka Obl.  14.9  41.9  6.8  50.0  0.537 (1) 
Magadan  Obl.  51.4 36.5 23.0 64.9  0.110 (1) 
Sakhalin  Obl.  58.1 59.5 33.8 83.8  0.002 (1) 
Minimum  10.8 9.5 1.4  35.1   
Maximum  63.5 78.4 43.2 87.8   
Mean  38.9 38.9 16.2 61.7   
 
Matrix C
R–1 has no one zero element, suggesting that there are neither isolated clusters of 
regions nor autarkic regions. Eventually, each region is linked with all others either directly or 
indirectly, through some chains of regions. In fact, three exponentiations prove sufficient for the 
matrix to have no zero elements; hence, each region is linked with any other through no more 
that two regions. Matrices C
R–1 constructed from results of testing with 3 and 12 lags do not   11
contain zero elements as well. This analysis provides an (indirect) evidence of absence of 
integration clubs in the Russian market. 
Table 3 evidences that the extent of inter-regional price linkages is high: on average, price 
shocks are transmitted in either direction between a region and 46 other regions (or 62% of their 
total number). This number varies across regions from 26 regions (35%) to 65 regions (88%). 
There is a group of regions with the weakest price linkages (i.e., with the least Nr) with the rest 
of the country  that is stable across lag lengths. It includes the Irkutsk and Vladimir oblasts. Such 
a group with the strongest linkages consists of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), and Saratov and 
Orenburg oblasts.  
The range of Nr→, the proportion of regions in which prices are Granger caused by price in 
r, is 11% to 64% (8 to 47 regions). The low-end group consists of the Republic of Tuva and 
Irkutsk Oblast. The Krasnodar and Khabarovsk krais belong to the high-end group. The 
proportion of regions that Granger cause price in r, Nr←, varies across regions from 9% to 78% 
(7 to 58 regions). Moscow stably enters into the low-end group. The high-end group is not stable 
enough across lags lengths; however, the Republic of Yakutia is close to belong to it. The 
proportion of regions, prices in which are both Granger cause price in r and are caused by price 
in r (bi-directional linkages), Nr↔, varies from 1% to 43% (1 to 32 regions). The Irkutsk Oblast, 
Moscow, and Republic of Buryatia are the low-end group, and the Belgorod Oblast belongs to 
the high-end group.  
Surprisingly, the extent of region’s price linkages does not depend on whether it is, 
according to Gluschenko (2006), integrated with the national market, or tending to integration 
with it, or non-integrated. The averages over each of these three region groups are close to those 
over all regions: the group averages of Nr→ fall in the range 31.2% to 36.2%; those of Nr← have 
the range 37.5% to 41.5%; the range is 15.7% to 16.8% for Nr↔; and the group averages of the 
total index, Nr, lie in the range 60.2% to 62.3%. One more surprising feature is a high extent of 
price linkages of difficult-to-access regions (remote regions with poor communications with the 
rest of Russia). These include the Murmansk, Magadan, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka oblasts, and 
the Republic of Yakutia. Their Nr equals 50.0% to 87.8%, the Republic of Yakutia having the 
maximal value across all Russian regions. 
Gluschenko (2006) find 36% of Russian regions to be integrated with the national market, 
44% of regions tending to integration with the national market, and 20% non-integrated with no   12
trend toward integration. Among non-integrated regions, non-integration is almost entirely 
caused by a constant non-zero disparity between prices in a given region and the national price, 
and not by deterministic or stochastic price divergence; there are only two cases of price 
divergence. Such a pattern is corroborated  by the above pattern of extensive price linkages in the 
Russian market. 
The last column of Table 3 suggests widespread spatial autocorrelation. In almost than two 
thirds of regions (61.3% or 46 regions), prices are Granger caused by their spatial lags. A 
number of cases are of interest. Spatial autocorrelation is strongly rejected for Moscow City. 
This conforms with low value of its Nr←, evidencing that the Moscow prices are weakly 
influenced by prices in other regions. On the other hand, the effect of Moscow prices on prices in 
other regions is not too wide: its Nr→ is well below the average. It is worth noting that Moscow 
was found by Gluschenko (2006) neither integrated nor tending to integration with the national 
market. The same, although to a lesser degree, is valid for Saint Petersburg.  
Prices in the Kamchatka and Magadan oblasts are not caused by those in the Primorski 
Krai, their only one trade neighbor, while being caused by prices in different regions. A possible 
explanation is that the Primorski Krai is, for the most part, a trans-shipment point for delivery of 
goods to these regions, and not a region of origin of the goods. The pattern is different for the 
rest three difficult-to-access regions (the Republic of Yakutia, Sakhalin and Murmansk oblasts) 
that have only one trade neighbor as well: spatial autocorrelation is not rejected for them. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using the cost of basket of 25 basic food goods as the price representative, price linkages 
of Russian regions have been analyzed with the use of Granger causality as a tool. Price linkages 
of Russian regions are found extensive. On average, an individual regional market is linked 
through prices with 62% of others, with the minimal number equaling 35%. Such a pattern 
corroborates the pattern of market integration found by Gluschenko (2006), in which the most 
regions are integrated or tending to integration with the national market.  
Neither isolated clusters of regions nor autarkic regions are found. Each region is linked 
with all others either directly or indirectly, through a chain of no more than two intermediate 
regions. This provides an evidence of absence of integration clubs in the Russian market.    13
Spatial autocorrelation is found to be widespread, taking place in two thirds of regions. 
Hence, to prevent a model misspecification, explicit account of spatial autocorrelation should be 
taken when constructing cross-sectional or panel models with the use of Russian regional price 
data.  
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